With the development of the Internet, new kinds of massive epidemics, distributed attacks, virtual conflicts and criminality have emerged. We present a study of some striking statistical properties of cyber-risks that quantify the distribution and time evolution of information risks on the Internet, to understand their mechanisms, and create opportunities to mitigate, control, predict and insure them at a global scale. First, we report an exceptionnaly stable power-law tail distribution of personal identity losses per event, Pr(ID loss
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet has developed into a global system of interconnected computer networks that allows the exchange of data between millions of private and public, academic, business, and government organizations. By making possible new forms of social interactions as well as new ways to probe them, the Internet provides a unique tool for studying the development and the organization of an archetypical complex system.
But, as in all complex biological and social systems known to us, upgrades of capacity, improved networking and additions of functionalities come together with its bundle of parasites, viruses and criminals. We ask what are the laws, in any, codifying this dynamics, and what are the possible roles and consequences of such apparently negative developments?
In biology, there is a growing realization that evolution has been driven and shaped by bacteria and viruses [1] . Similarly, social organizations, which are founded on laws and regulations, and which are anchored on national (as well as sub-and super-national) boundaries, have arguably been shaped in significant part by the need to coordinate and cooperate in the face of disruptions emerging from within and from the outside. In this vein, we ask what may the exploding level of criminality and of unlawful exploitation of the Internet teach us on the organization of other complex systems? Are there robust dynamics or universal laws that can be inferred and tested? What does the fact, that electronic crime has appeared and developed concommittantly with the growth of the Internet, teach us on its organization, its vulnerabilities and its future development?
Given the breadth of these questions, our contribution is to focus on a specific criminality which is now becoming rampant, the theft of personal information (ID thefts). Using the most complete dataset from the Open Security Foundation [2], we are able to identify an explosive growth of ID losses followed by a regime which seems to have matured into a stationary phase. We document a very heavy-tailed power-law distribution (an often reported hallmark of complex systems) of severities of ID theft events, which is robust over all time periods and across different types of social organizations (private and public). By quantifying the scaling of losses as a function of organization sizes, we unearth a significant size effect.
II. MATURATION AND SEVERITY OF ID LOSSES: NON-STATIONARY AND STATIONARY PROPERTIES

A. Contextual data description
From early (gentle) hackers breaking in systems to demonstrate their skills, some turned into seasoned "black hats" making money as part of an explosively growing business based on ubiquitous Internet insecurity [3, 4] . Compared with the attacks that used to disrupt network on a large scale, most electronic attacks nowadays extract out valuable data while remaining quite furtive [5] . This can be likened to an electronic form of massive parasitism.
In terms of monetary value and volume, one of the largest types of data targeted by pirates is personal identity information (ID), such as credit card numbers, social security numbers, banking accounts, and medical files. Since each ID theft or leakage is a "loss of control" of one's individual private data, it can be considered already as a damaging event, forerunning the potential realized financial and/or social losses [6] . Actually, stealing ID's is the goal which is common to a wide spectrum of non-destructive Internet attacks focused on profit, from botnets to highly tailored attacks [7, 8, 9, 10] . The (uncontrolled) dissemination of personal information raises the important social issue of people's identity resilience in the information technology era [5, 6] . In our quantitative study of cyber-risks, we take a ID theft as a usable elementary unit of cyber-risks, for two main reasons. First, it provides a natural metric of the "permeability" of information systems, guiding towards the identification of the underlying mechanisms. Second, it offers a common basis, or currency, to compare a large variety of heterogeneous events involving many different types of organizations.
ID loss event data have been thoroughly collected by several independant organizations.
We use the most complete dataset from the Open Security Foundation The catalog provides also the involved organization, the date and amount of loss (measured as the numbers of ID stolen). Data are homogeneously sampled among various types of organizations: business (35%), education (30%), governments (24%) and medical institutions (10%). We define an event following the procedure described in Ref. [2, 11] . For instance, the largest entries in the data set are (i) the discovery and disclosure of an attack over several years of the TJX Companies with a probable exposition of more than 90 millions The two pieces of information provided by the two panels of Figure 1 imply that the rate N(V, t) of events of size V occurring at time t can be factorized under the form
where C(t) and pdf(V ) constitute two independent contributors to cyber-risks. The macrovariable C(t) embodies the overall evolution of the level of threat associated with ID losses.
In other words, it provides a metric quantifying the systemic "state of insecurity" of the Internet. In contrast, pdf(V ) measures the relative frequency of large versus small ID losses.
While the rate of attacks has varied enormously between 2000 and 2008 as shown by the behavior of C(t) in the upper panel of Figure 1 , the relative frequencies of various event sizes has remained remarkably stable, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 . We now turn to the determination of pdf(V ) in order to characterize quantitatively the level of cyber risks per event.
III. DISTRIBUTION OF ID THEFT EVENT SIZES AND CONSEQUENCES
A. Power-Law versus Stretched Exponential
Given the result of the previous section that a unique distribution pdf(V ) is sufficient to describe the frequency of event sizes in all time windows from 2000 to 2008, we now determine pdf(V ) by using the largest possible statistical sample including all events of this period. Figure 2 presents the (non-normalized) empirical survival (also called complementary cumulative) distribution functionF u (V ), defined as the probability that the number of victims in a given event is larger than or equal to V in the range V ≥ u. Note thatF u (V ) has a shape similar to the PDFs shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 with an approximately straight tail in this double-logarithmic scale, suggesting a power law distribution
This power law (2) is observed over more than three decades above the lower threshold u ≈ However, visual evidence and MLE are not sufficient to demonstrate that the power law (2) is adequate to describe our statistical data of ID thefts, as discussed in several earlier works [15, 16, 17] . To prove that the one-parameter power law (2) is sufficient, we embed it into a broader two-parameter law that have previously been reported to provide a flexible model of many empirical fat-tailed distribution [15] and perform a standard log-likelihood ratio (Wilks) test. Specifically, we use the "stretched exponential" (SE) familȳ
where c and d are respectively the shape and scale parameters of the SE distribution. Malevergne et al. [17] have shown that the power law family (2) is asymptotically embedded in this SE family in the limit
This has two practical applications: (i) the calibration of c and d for a given u provides an alternative determination (using (4) of the exponent b of the power law (2) if c is indeed small (typically less than 0.3); (ii) we can use the formal likelihood ratio test of embedded hypotheses which has been shown to hold for the power law seen as asymptotically embedded in the SE family [17, 18] , to determine whether the one-parameter power law is sufficient or a two-parameter distribution like the SE is necessary. Inset LLR< 0 indicating that the power law is not sufficient and that the SE is necessary; in contrast, for u ≥ 7 · 10 4 , the power law is sufficient and the SE is not necessary, degenerating into the power law as the condition (4) becomes valid.
B. Evidence for incompleteness of reported losses for small event sizes
We now discuss two possible hypotheses for the observed cross-over at u ≈ 7 · 10 4 below which the distributions shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 and in Figure 2 exhibit a significant downward curvature characterizing a deviation from the power law (2).
A first possible interpretation is that this deviation from the power law reflects the fact that hackers are preferentially targeting large organizations offering substantial potential gains. As a consequence, there would be practically no ID thefts involving only a few individuals. This hypothesis does not stand closer scrutiny: there is strong evidence that millions of home computers are compromised [8] via the use of botnet deployment mechanisms centrally managed by pirates [7] , with each computer infection being a unique event potentially leading to ID thefts limited to those IDs which are stored in the computer.
According to Vinton Cerf's, 100 − 150 millions computers over a total of 600 millions are compromised [19] . As a rough estimation, assuming that all computers have about the same probability of being infected and counting one computer per Internet user, this implies that about one sixth of US computers are exposed. Thus, about 50 millions US citizen are constantly exposed to attacks targeting their own computer. Such events should thus provide a huge population of small ID theft events' which is absent from even the most complete dataset of the Open Security Foundation [2].
C. Super-linear growth of the ID loss threat
There is another remarkable consequence deriving straightforwardly from the power law events increases, due to the never decreasing influence of the largest event sizes. Then, the cumulative sum V(t) of all losses over all events up to time t is controlled by the few largest events in the catalog [20] . This leads to a faster-than-linear growth
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This results is solely due to the statistical mechanism that, as more events occur, some are bound to explore more and more the tail of the heavy-tailed power law distribution (2).
Note this law (5) constitutes a lower bound, which is attained only when the rate of event occurrences is itself not growing, as seems to be the case since July 2006.
Such faster-than-linear growths due to the pure statistical power law mechanism have been documented in natural hazards for losses caused by floods [21] and for the cumulative seismic energy released at regional scales [22] (see [20] for a detailed mathematical derivation and discussion). Given the heavy-tail nature of the distribution of ID theft numbers per event, we should not be surprised that the Internet appears more and more insecure and dangerous, just as a result of this mechanism.
IV. IN CYBER-RISKS, SIZE MATTERS A. Cross-sectional universality of ID losses
We have shown that the PDF of event sizes is constant over time. We now investigate whether there exists some difference between the PDFs of event sizes in a cross-sectional analysis of different sectors of activity, which could reveal different vulnerability characteristics.
Our datasource uses four distinct sectors of activity: publicly traded companies (Biz), schools and universities (Edu), governmental agencies (Gov), and medical services (Med).
Distinct regulations and industry benchmarking imply that organizations implement homogenous security processes in a given sector, but these security processes operating in a given sector are different from those in a different sector. A priori, one could expect that distinct factors acting in these different sectors imply dissimilar attractiveness to hackers leading to different levels of vulnerability, which should be revealed in the statistical properties of the catalogs of ID losses. In contradiction with this anticipation, the top panel of Figure 3 shows that one cannot reject the hypothesis that the PDFs of ID loss size per event are identical for the four sectors Biz, Edu, Gov, Med.
If two typical organizations belonging to two different sectors are subjected to distinct exposition and permeability threats, the remarkable conclusion suggested by the top panel of Figure 3 is that the associated level of security just compensates for the increasing threat, 8 putting all organizations at a similar overall risk level. This result is reminiscent of the effect documented in Refs. [23, 24] , that systems exposed to different distributions of attacks converge to similar level of vulnerabilities when they try to optimize their efficiency in the presence of constraints. This could mean that organizations, which are indeed attempting to optimize their defenses against cyber-risks, may have already reached an intrinsic barrier.
With the evolving nature of the threats and given the complexity of the associated processes in the presence of limited resources, the observed level of ID losses may be a robust dynamical equilibrium that will be difficult to improve upon. This suggests that, in absence of a fundamentally new qualitative paradigm, these cyber-risks are bound to remain with us for the foreseeable future.
B. Size effects of vulnerabilities to cyber-risks
The bottom panel of Figure 3 plots the PDFs of victims per event sorted by target organization sizes. There are several possible measures for the size of an organization. Here, we take the number of employees, which correlated well with other measures [25] . The PDFs are constructed for 269 universities [26] and 105 publicly traded companies [27] . The good collapse of the PDFs confirms the universality of the power law distribution of event loss sizes, as in Fig.1 and Fig. 2 .
However, the tails of the PDFs are truncated at upper values which seem to grow with the organization sizes. This size effect is better revealed by the scatter plot of the inset in the bottom panel of Figure 3 , which shows that the largest losses V max for a given range of organization sizes S seem to grow with S. This visual impression is confirmed by performing linear regressions of log V (q) as a function of log S, log V (q) = σ log S + ǫ, where V (q) is the 99% quantile of the losses for a given organization size S. We find a stable determination of the exponent σ ≈ 1.3 ± 0.1. This means that the largest losses for a given set of entities of size S grow with S as V max ∼ S σ ≈ S 1.3 .
Naively, one would have expected a linear growth with σ = 1. The faster-than-linear law may express a combination of effects, which include a faster-than-linear growth of the number of IDs stored in a given entity as a function of its number of employees, a bigger exposition that makes the attacks of large entities more attractive to hackers and possibly a greater vulnerability due to more bridges or "boundaries" with the external world which are more difficult to manage. The faster-than-linear law is characteristic of a size effect which is similar to the size effects documented for instance in material failure [28] and species fragility [29] .
We now show how σ is related to the exponent b of the PDFs of event loss sizes defined in (2). For this, we write the probability Pr(ID losses ≥ V ) to find an event with more than V ID losses as
where S min is a minimum size for an organization to be viable, and Z(S) is the distribution of organization sizes, well-known to follow Zipf's law (Z(S) ∼ 1/S 1+µ with µ ≈ 1) [25, 30, 31] so that Z(S) · dS is the number of organizations with sizes between S and S + dS. Moreover,
is the probability to find an event with more than V ID losses in a given organization of size S. We know one property of Pr 1 (ID losses ≥ V |S), namely that it drops abruptly to vanishing values for V > C · S σ , where C is a positive constant, as documented above. This implies that, for a fixed V , all integrants with S < (V /C) 1/σ do not contribute to the integral. Motivated by the power law (2), we also assume a power law shape for Pr 1 (ID losses ≥ V |S) with exponent b 1 . Putting all this together, expression (6) becomes
with 0) . In other words, the efforts necessary to get just a few or a large number of IDs are not much different, once an organization has been compromised. Our conclusion does not rely sensitively on the validity of Zipf's law. However, the value b < 1 imposes a bound on the exponent µ of Zipf's law which cannot be significantly larger than 1.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented three different tests that confirm the general validity and robustness of the probability distribution of ID losses per event (where ID losses has been taken as a proxy for information risks on the Internet). We showed that the PDFs are the same irrespective of (i) the growth phase before July 2006 versus stationary regime thereafter,
(ii) the sectors of activity, and (iii) the size of targeted organisations. Returning to the questions raised in the introduction, it is striking and a priori counter intuitive to find that all organisations are evenly vulnerable, whatever their implemented information security. This raises important questions concerning the tradeoff between exposition and counter-measures in the complex evolving landscape of cyber-risks. The consequences on the evolution of the Internet remain to be studied. This present paper provides a first partial approach of the study of the development of the Internet and of cyber-risks taking into account their intricate entanglement.
We have shown the existence of a size effect, such that the largest possible ID losses per event grow faster-than-linearly with the organization size. This has led us to derive two important consequences. First, the small value b ≃ 0.7 of the power law distribution of ID thefts is explained by interplay between Zipf's law and the size effect. Second, we have found indirect evidence that compromised entities typically expose to hackers a small or large number of IDs with basically the same frequency. This inference is very important for the quantification of cyber risks and suggests that counter-measures should be targeted towards building internal barriers, avoiding the "Titanic" effect of inadequate compartmentalization. functions (PDF) of victims per event sorted by sizes of the target organizations. We construct one PDF per decade in organization sizes, i.e., we collect all events occurring for organizations of sizes between S * and 10 × S * and construct the corresponding PDF. We then vary S * across the whole sample (to avoid overlapping we take only one out of fifty PDFs). All PDFs exhibit a good collapse, confirming the universality of the power law distribution of event loss sizes, as in Fig.1 and Fig. 2 . Similarly to presented above, by performing linear regressions of (log) quantiles of all samples, we cannot rule out that all samples are drawn from the same probability distribution.
The inset shows in double logarithmic scale a scatter plot of the losses (V ) as a function of size for 374 entities. The straight line with slope ≃ 1.3 is the best linear fit (p = 0.00 and R 2 = 0.74) of the 99% percentile of the logarithmic losses for both 269 universities (blue plus symbols) [26] and 105 publicly traded companies (red crosses) [27] as a function of organization logarithmic size.
